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THE EUROPEAN COMPANY STATUTE –  
EXAMINATION OF ITS IMPACTS ON CO-DETERMINATION 
 
 
At the Nice Summit in December 2000, after more than 30 years of 
controversial debate, the Council of Ministers agreed on the European 
Company Statute (Societas Europaea = SE). In this context two legal 
instruments were enacted, the council regulation (No. 2157/2001) on the 
Statute for a European company, which rules the internal corporate 
governance structure of the SE, and the council directive (2001/86/EC) 
supplementing the Statute for a European company with regard to the 
involvement of employees on the company level, which emphasises 
voluntary negotiations between employees’ representatives, a so-called 
special negotiating body, and the management. In October 2004, the SE 
can be established by companies based in the EU and the EEA for the first 
time. 
 
The legal form of the SE provides companies all-over Europe extensive 
opportunities for structural adjustments in accordance with their 
organisational needs. However, it does not only have substantial impacts 
on the companies’ capacity to act but also on the Member States. 
Actually, the introduction of this new form of enterprise is expected to put 
considerable pressure on the national corporate governance systems as 
well as on the national fiscal systems. Additionally, the paradigm shift of 
the Community is remarkable regarding co-determination. This means, 
the Community does not try to establish a specific institutional pattern 
anymore, but pushes procedures that promote the idea of worker 
participation in management’s decisions. 
 
The paper gives a brief overview of the emergence of the SE. Then, the 
contents of the regulation and the directive are presented. Subsequently, 
the focus of the paper is on the impacts on co-determination taking into 
consideration exemplarily the great variety of forms of worker 
participation currently prevalent in the EU and the EEA. 
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Emergence 
Since the 1920ies, the idea of a transnational legal form1 was discussed 
by some institutions (for details see Bärmann, 1970; Theisen/Wenz, 
2002). The discussion about a European legal form began during the 
Notary Convention in France in 1959, when the French notary Tibièrge 
suggested the introduction of a European public limited company. In the 
following years especially the Dutch Professor Pieter Sanders promoted 
the idea and even worked with experts on a proposal for a statute of a 
European company, which should have had a uniform legal basis in, at 
that time, six Member States (Sanders, 1966). In June 1970, the 
Commission presented her first proposal of a regulation to the Council of 
Ministers (European Commission, 1970). After the European Parliament 
and the European Economic and Social Committee commented the 
proposal, it was presented again to the Council of Ministers, in 1975. 
Overall, the proposal was groundbreaking. It would have created group 
law and established a European Works Council as well as board-level 
representation. However – or rather because of that - the Member States, 
where company law was not developed very much at that time, were not 
about to accept it. In the following 25 years, the idea of a European form 
of enterprise was discussed heavily. Particularly the issue of employee 
involvement caused disagreement and led to suspension of the debate 
again and again. 
 
In the history of the European Company (Societas Europaea = SE) some 
milestones can be identified. First of all, with the proposals of 1989 
(European Commission, 1989 a and b) and 1991 (European Commission, 
1991 a and b) the SE became a hybrid form, meaning that the 
Commission gave up its plan to establish a uniform company law. It 
wanted to create a form of enterprise that was on the one hand subject to 
community law, but at the same time was governed by national law. 
Additionally, the presented regulation was split in two parts: a regulation 
on the statute of the SE and a directive supplementing this regulation with 
regard to the standing – not participation – of employees. The 
Commission under its president Jacques Delors offered a compromise to 
the issue of worker participation by suggesting three equivalent models of 
employee involvement – equivalent in the opinion of the Commission. 
However, Member States were not able to agree on it. 
 
Even though the discussion on the SE was motivated politically, the 
companies’ management did not give up lobbying for the creation of a 
transnational legal form. As another milestone in this context can be seen 
the so-called Davignon Report, i.e. a report of a group of high ranking 
experts on European systems of worker involvement published in 1997 
(European Commission, 1997). This group of experts was asked by the 
                                            
1 The terms form of enterprise, legal form, and legal structure are used interchangeably. 
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Commission to suggest a solution for the issue of worker participation. 
Overall, they did not want to consider one system of worker participation 
as better than the other one resulting in the suggestion of “negotiations in 
good faith between the parties concerned, with a view to identifying the 
best solution in each case, without imposing minimum requirements” 
(European Commission, 1997, paragraph 95). However, Member States 
still could not agree on the SE.  
 
In fact, it needed another two compromises or say milestones. The first 
compromise is the so-called “before and after” principle meaning that 
employees’ rights that were in force before the foundation of a SE should 
lie the basis for employee involvement after the establishment (Herfs-
Röttgen, 2001; Blanquet 2002). Additionally, it was specified that this 
approach does not only apply to the initial establishment of a SE, but also 
to structural changes in existing European companies (Council Directive 
2001/86/EC, recital 18). But still, Spain could not agree on the SE, 
because it thought that the provisions on worker participation were too 
far-reaching. Consequently, in December 2000, the Member States agreed 
on the so-called opting-out clause allowing Member States not to apply 
the standard rules regarding worker involvement in case of a merger of 
companies that are based in countries where no worker involvement is 
granted by law (Council Directive 2001/86/EC, recital 9). Eventually, on 
October 8th, 2001 the Council of Ministers enacted two legal instruments: 
the council regulation (No. 2157/2001) on the Statute for a European 
company (SE), subsequently referred to as SE/Re, and the council 
directive (2001/86/EC) supplementing the Statute for a European 
company with regard to the involvement of employees, subsequently 
referred to as SE/Di. 
 
The Legal Acts 
On October 8th, 2004 joint stock companies2 located at least in two 
Member States3 or doing business in at least two Member States by 
branches or subsidiaries can form a SE. Thus, the SE can be seen as 
another legal alternative for companies instead of legal forms provided by 
national law. The minimum capital, which must be divided into shares, is 
€ 120,000.-- suggesting that the establishment of a SE is only reasonable 
for large groups (Hommelhoff, 2001). Additionally, the abbreviation “SE” 
provided exclusively for European companies must be put in front of or 
behind the company name (SE/Re article 11).  
 
                                            
2 For a comprehensive list of all legal forms concerned, the reader is referred to the Annex of the 
SE/Re. 
3 In this case, Member States means not only EU Member States but also Member States of the 
European Economic Area (EEA), because the EEA joint committee took the decision (No 93/2002) to 
accept the SE/Re and the SE/Di. 
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In general, the SE/Re provides four forms of foundation. First of all, an SE 
can be established by a merger, which is only available to public limited 
companies from at least two different EU or EEA Member States. In this 
context, Wenz (2003), who examined the legal instruments as to their 
practical applications, talks of a merger-SE, i.e. a merger of two equal 
partners, or an acquisitions-SE, i.e. one company acquires, respectively, 
absorbs another (similar at Kloster, 2003). 
 
Secondly, a SE can be found by the formation of a holding company, 
which is available to public and private limited companies that have their 
registered offices in at least two different EU or EEA Member States or 
have subsidiaries or branches in Member States other than that of their 
registered office. Additionally, a holding-SE can form a subsidiary-SE, 
which is considered as secondary form of foundation (Hommelhoff, 2001). 
According to Wenz (2003), the holding-SE might play a considerable role 
for parent companies from countries outside the EU and the EEA in order 
to reorganise their business in Europe.  
 
Thirdly, a SE can be established by the formation of a joint subsidiary, 
which is available under the same circumstances applicable to the 
formation of a holding company to any legal entities governed by public or 
private law. This form of foundation might be of importance for companies 
that are interested in close cooperation with other companies in certain 
fields. Consequently, the companies involved might establish a Joint-
Venture-SE (Wenz, 2003). 
 
Finally, the SE can be found by the conversion of a public limited company 
that was previously formed under national law and had a subsidiary in at 
least one other EU or EEA Member State for at least two years. In this 
context, Wenz (2003) talks about a reengineering-SE. Even though a 
(national) public limited company converted into a SE is not allowed to 
move its registered office at the same time as the transformation takes 
place (SE/Re article 37 paragraph 3) and is not allowed to reduce the 
intensity of board-level representation (SE/Di article 4 paragraph 4), 
companies might benefit from a transformation, because then they can 
choose between a one-tier and a second-tier structure. According to Wenz 
(2003) this aspect increases undoubtedly the interest of companies in the 
SE.  
 
Furthermore, Wenz (2003) identifies another application of the European 
company statute, the cross-border-SE that means the transfer of 
registered office (SE/Re article 7). According to the SE/Re the transfer of 
registered office does not require liquidation and new foundation of the 
company anymore. Rather companies are able to transfer their registered 
office by preserving their legal identity resulting in a higher degree of 
mobility of the SE. Even though the possibility to transfer registered office 
is not completely unlimited, as aforementioned, the provisions contribute 
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considerably to the completion of the SE’s freedom of establishment and 
undoubtedly will increase the mobility of European companies. 
 
For the statutes is specified that the SE must have a general meeting of 
shareholders and either a management board and a supervisory board, 
so-called two-tier system, or an administrative board, so-called single-tier 
system, as governing bodies (articles 38 to 45 and 52 to 59). The 
companies are completely free to choose between the one-tier-system 
and the two-tier-system. In sum the SE/Re contains fundamental 
provisions regarding the SE’s internal corporate governance structure (see 
for example, Herfs-Röttgen, 2001; Heinze, 2002; Hirte, 2002; Lutter 
2002). However, Member States still determine a great deal of applicable 
law, such as tax law (Hommelhoff, 2001; Schulz/Geismar, 2001), 
reporting standards, liability, disclosure requirements, and even rule 
amendment of the articles as well as capital raising and maintenance of 
capital (Theisen/Wenz, 2002). Consequently, it can be expected that the 
SE will not have a uniform European design, but 284 different ones. 
 
This diversity in design and the simplified opportunity of transfer of 
registered office might challenge corporate governance systems all over 
Europe. In this context, Grundmann (2001) argues that this kind of 
competition between the Member States’ corporate governance systems 
should not be rejected from the start, but rather is desirable, because this 
competition might minimise state and market failure. Even though it 
cannot be predicted, if this competition results in a race-to-the-bottom or 
a climb-to-the-top – a controversially debated issue (Charny, 1991; 
Grundmann, 2001; Wymeersch, 2001). Considering this argument of the 
race-to-the-bottom, the SE could also be viewed as a mandatory 
minimum standard for companies that do business cross-boarders aimed 
at restricting unlimited, ruinous competition on incorporations between 
Member States (Theisen/Wenz, 2002).  
 
After having outlined the SE/Re and its implications for corporate 
governance systems persistent in Europe, the paper turns to employee 
involvement in the SE, which is ruled by the SE/Di (see for instance 
Pluskat, 2001; Heinze, 2002; Teichmann, 2002; Köstler, 2003). The 
crucial link between the SE/Re and the SE/Di is that the SE may not be 
registered unless an agreement on arrangements for employee 
involvement has been concluded (for details see SE/Re article 12 
paragraph 2; see also Blanquet, 2002). By that, it is guaranteed that the 
provisions on co-determination are respected (Weiss, 2003). 
 
At this point of analysis, it is pointed out that the SE/Di does not affect 
national provisions regarding worker participation at the plant level, 
meaning, for instance, that the German Works Constitution Act 
(Betriebsverfassungsgesetz – BetrVG) is still applicable (Köstler, 2002). 
                                            
4 25 EU Member States and 3 Member States of the European Economic Area 
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The SE/Di rather deals with transnational information and consultation 
rights on the one hand and with board-level representation on the other 
(Heinze, 2002; Teichmann, 2002; Weiss, 2003). 
 
While information and consultation procedures have to be established in 
any SE, the intensity of board-level representation in the SE is subject to 
voluntary negotiations which are conducted by management and the 
special negotiating body (SNB) that represents employees of all 
companies concerned and is established as soon as possible after the plan 
of establishing a SE was announced by the management. In principle, the 
employees’ representatives are elected or appointed – dependent on 
national provisions – in proportion to the number of employees in each 
Member State of the companies concerned. Simply put, every country in 
which the companies concerned do business shall be represented with one 
vote (Köstler, 2002; ETUC, 2003). In general, the SNB may ask assistance 
in negotiations of experts of choice (SE/Di article 3 paragraph 6) who then 
have an advisory function. Costs incurred must be beard by the 
companies, even though Member States can set limits. Besides provision 
on the election or appointment of the employees’ representatives in the 
SNB the Member States may provide that trade unionist can be members 
of the SNB, irrespectively, whether they are employees of the companies 
concerned or not (SE/DI article 3 paragraph 2 lit b).  
 
Generally speaking, each member of the SNB has one vote (SE/Di article 
3 paragraph 4). In principle, the SNB can agree on any form of co-
determination, as long as the agreement is accepted with the absolute 
majority. Is co-determination reduced when a SE is established by a 
merger or by creating a holding company or forming a subsidiary5, a two-
third majority decision representing two-thirds of the employees that are 
employed in at least two Member States is required, when 25 percent 
(creation of a merger-SE), respectively, 50 percent (creation of a holding-
SE or subsidiary-SE) of the employees concerned where covered by any 
form of co-determination so far. Additionally, the SNB may agree with a 
qualified majority decision that negotiations are not commenced at all or 
are terminated (SE/Di article 3 paragraph 6) resulting in the application of 
national law regarding information and consultation of employees, as a 
rule application of the Directive on the European Works Council 
(94/45/EC) (Heinze, 2002; Keller, 2002).  
 
After the SNB is established the negotiations shall commence as soon as 
possible. The duration of negotiations is fixed by the SE/Di to six months, 
but may be extended up to one year from the SNB’s establishment by 
agreement of the parties involved (SE/Di article 5). The task of the SNB is 
to negotiate with the management of the companies concerned about an 
agreement on the arrangements for the involvement of the employees 
                                            
5 Is the SE established by conversion, then a reduction of co-determination is ex lege not possible 
(SE/Di article 4 paragraph 4). 
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within the SE (SE/Di article 4). The agreement shall specify the scope of 
the agreement, the composition, the functions, the procedure for 
information and consultation, and the frequency of meetings of the 
representative body as well as the financial and material resources to be 
allocated to the representative body. If the SNB and the management 
agree on board-level representation, the number of members and the 
procedure of their election, appointment, recommendation or opposition 
by employees and their rights shall be specified in the agreement, too. 
Additionally, it shall specify the date of entry into force, its duration, cases 
were the agreement should be renegotiated and the procedure for 
renegotiation. If the parties do not arrive at an agreement within the 
prescribed time and the management still wants to form a SE, or the 
parties involved agree so, then standard rules are applicable (SE/Di article 
7 and part three of the annex).  
 
In the annex of the SE/Di, the standard rules are divided into three parts. 
Part one contains provisions on the composition of the representative 
body. Standard rules regarding information and consultation can be found 
in part two. In Annex part 3, participation is governed. Which part of the 
standard rules is applied depends on some criteria. The standard rules 
concerning the composition of the representative body and those for 
information and consultation are applied, if the negotiating parties agree 
so. Additionally, they are applied, when the negotiations failed, but the 
management still wants to establish an European company and the SNB 
did not make a decision according to SE/Di article 3 paragraph 6. 
 
With respect to standard rules regarding participation, not only the afore-
mentioned criteria must be fulfilled but also some additional ones that are 
bound to the form of foundation and on the proportion of the total number 
of employees of the companies concerned who were covered by a certain 
form of co-determination so far (SE/Di article 7). These criteria are 
presented below in Table 1.  
 
Form of foundation 
Standard rules regarding participation apply, 
when … 
Transformation 
Employees have been covered by any form of 
participation so far. Then, this regime must be 
maintained. 
Merger 
25% of the employees were covered by any form 
of participation so far or even less than 25% if 
the negotiating parties agree so. Then, this 
regime must be maintained. 
Holding or subsidiary 
50% of the employees were covered by any form 
of participation so far or even less than 50% if 
the negotiating parties agree so. Then, this 
regime must be maintained. 
Table 1: Standard rules regarding participation 
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Besides provisions on the negotiation procedure, the content of the 
agreement and the standard rules, the SE/Di contains also miscellaneous 
provisions, such as the reservation and confidentiality (article 8), the 
operation of the representative body and procedure for the information 
and consultation of employees (article 9), the protection of employees’ 
representatives (article 10), the misuse of procedure (article 11), and the 
compliance with the Directive (article 12). However, these provisions are 
not presented here in detail. 
 
Finally, an overview of the negotiations and its outcomes are presented 
below in Figure 1. 
Figure 1: Employee participation in the SE 
(Adapting Keller, 2002:205; Blanquet, 2002; Heinze, 2002; Röthig, 2002) 
 
Issues 
As indicated above, the critical issue with regard to worker involvement in 
the SE can be seen in negotiations between management and the SNB 
aimed to come to an agreement. However, an even more critical issue 
might be that the members of the SNB must agree on the form of worker 
participation they want enforce before the SNB can negotiate it with the 
management. The outcome of that “internal” negotiations cannot be 
predicted due to heavily varying preferences, aims, traditions, and roles 
regarding worker participation in Europe. In order to make that point 
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clear, two positions considered as the extremes of the “worker 
participation’s continuum” are presented in more detail: the UK with no 
rights for board-level representation and Germany with extensive rights 
for board-level representation. Additionally, Norway is presented as an 
example from the EEA Member States.6 
 
In Germany, employees have considerable legal rights regarding board 
level-representation: the Coal, Iron and Steel Industry Co-Determination 
Act (1951), the Co-Determination Amendment Act (1956), the Works 
Constitution Act (1952), and the Co-Determination Act (1976). The 
procedure of appointment or election of representatives varies with 
respect to the size of the company and their industries. In all companies 
with 500 to 2,000 employees, one-third of the members of the 
supervisory board represent the employees. In companies with more than 
2,000 employees even one-half of the members of the supervisory board 
are employees’ representatives. In these large companies, the chair 
represents the shareholders and has a double vote in case of critical 
decisions in the supervisory board. The labour director, who is a member 
of the management board, could be appointed without agreement of the 
employees, but this seems rather being hypothetical. In the coal, iron and 
steel industries, the neutral member is appointed by the management and 
the employees’ representatives in order to avoid a deadlock. The labour 
director can only be appointed with the agreement of the employees’ 
representatives.  
 
In Norway, board-level representation in private sector enterprises is quite 
common. There is substantial legislation on worker participation in the 
private sector, the 1976 Companies Act, the 1980 Foundations Act, and 
the 1985 Act on general and limited partnerships. In general, one third of 
the members of the board are elected by the employees. If the companies 
have “corporate assemblies” or a similar body additionally to the board, 
then employees are represented in both bodies. Companies that are not 
covered by the legal framework might conclude voluntary arrangements. 
In public sector enterprises, however, no uniform set of rules regarding 
board-level representation is provided. Nevertheless, in some state and 
municipal institutions some form of board-level representation can be 
found.  
 
The following table (see Table 2) gives an overview of EU and EEA 
countries where some form of board-level representation is compulsory 
for private and privatised companies.  
 
                                            
6 The following description of board-level representation in Germany, Norway and the UK refers mainly 
to Schulten et al (1998) and Mävers (2002). 
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Country 
Number of employees representatives on the 
board 
Structure 
Austria 1/3 of supervisory board Dualistic 
Czech Republic 1/3 of supervisory board Dualistic 
Denmark 
1/3 of supervisory board (at least two 
members) 
Monistic 
Finland 
According to an agreement between the 
employer and the personnel groups 
Mixed 
France According to the type and size of company Mixed 
Germany 
According to the type and size of company: 
1/3 or ½ of board 
Dualistic 
Hungary 1/3 of supervisory board Dualitstic 
Ireland 1/3 of board (between 1 and 5 directors) Monistic 
Luxembourg 1/3 of board Monistic 
The Netherlands 
No legal provision to appoint or elect a 
certain number of employee representatives, 
but the works council has a veto power 
Dualistic 
Norway 1/3 of board Mixed 
Poland 
In partly or formerly state-owned 
companies: 1 to 4 members of the board 
Dualistic 
Slovakia 1/3 of supervisory board Dualistic 
Slovenia 1/3 to ½ of supervisory board Dualistic 
Sweden 2 members of the board Monistic 
Table 2: EU/EEA Member States with board-level-representation in private and 
privatised companies 
(adapting Schulten et al, 1998; Kluge and Stollt, 2004a and b) 
 
In the United Kingdom, there is no legal right for board-level 
representation. Instead of worker participation provided by law as known, 
for instance, in Germany or Austria, collective bargaining, understood as a 
“mechanism for the determination of pay rates and other basic terms and 
conditions for the majority of the workforce and more generally represents 
a key arena for the conduct of collective relations between managers and 
managed” (Blyton/Turnbull, 1994:175), is of great importance. In the 
1970ies after Britain’s accession to the European Economic Community, 
claims for board-level representation raised. In the following years, two 
reports, the Bullock Report and the White Paper, were published that 
offered proposals for the introduction of board-level representation. At 
that time and later, some formerly state-owned enterprises, for example 
British Railways or the British Steel Corporation, tried to establish some 
form of board-level representation. Due to those companies bad 
performance and the fact that the idea of worker participation did not gain 
acceptance on the social partner’s agenda, the matter was given up. 
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In Table 3, EU and EEA countries can be found that do not have legal 
obligations regarding board-level representation in private or privatised 
companies 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3: EU/EEA Member States without board-level-representation in private 
and privatised companies (adapting SWX, 2002; LLB, 2003; ICEX, 2004; Kluge 
and Stollt, 2004a and 2004b) 
 
By description of the state of the art of board-level representation in three 
countries out of the 28, the great variety of systems was demonstrated 
plainly. The differences in these systems are according to Bean (1994:80) 
“not simply the result of chance occurrence or historical accident, but 
develop(s) instead because of identifiable forces”, such as the economic 
environment, law and public policy, social attitudes, and the demographic 
and technological context (Katz and Kochan, 1992; Kochan, 1980). 
Considering these differences between national systems of board-level 
representation, it becomes obvious that agreement between the members 
of the SNB might be difficult to accomplish.  
 
But what does this mean for the creation of a SE? In the following, cases 
are presented that illustrate the impact of the forms of foundation on the 
negotiation outcome.  
 
Country Comments 
Belgium  
Cyprus  
Estonia  
Greece 
Board-level-representation only in state-owned 
companies 
Iceland  
Italy  
Latvia  
Liechtenstein  
Lithuania  
Malta 
Board-level-representation only in state-owned 
companies 
Portugal 
Board-level-representation only in state-owned 
companies 
Spain 
Board-level-representation only in state-owned 
companies and saving banks 
United Kingdom  
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Case 1. Company A, a UK ltd. with 4,500 employees in the UK has a 
subsidiary in Germany with 3,500 employees and Company B, a Spanish 
SA with 2,000 employees, want to form a holding-SE seated in the 
Netherlands. The SNB consists of 11 members (5 from the UK, 4 from 
Germany and another 2 from Spain). The SNB can agree on any form of 
worker participation by an absolute majority, because the number of 
employees concerned covered by any form of worker participation before 
the formation of a SE is still below the threshold of 50% applicable in case 
of formation of a holding-SE (only the German employees were covered 
by worker participation so far). If the management and the SNB agree so 
or negotiations fail but the management still wants to establish a holding-
SE than the standard rules apply. This means, that proceedings regarding 
information and consultation (SE/Di Appendix Part I and II) are applicable, 
while the threshold for the application of the standard rule regarding 
board-level representation is not accomplished. The registered office can 
be transferred to the Netherlands. 
 
Case 2. Company A, a UK ltd. with 4,500 employees in the UK, Company 
B, a German AG with 2,500 employees, and Company C, a Spanish SA 
with 3,000 employees, want to merge and transfer its seat to the 
Netherlands. The SNB consists of 11 members (5 from the UK, 3 from 
Germany and another 3 from Spain). In case of a merger, it must be 
ensured that all participating companies are represented in the SNB. This 
criteria is fulfilled here. The SNB can agree on the form of worker 
participation that covered at least 25% of the total number of employees 
before the creation of the merger by an absolute majority, ie the German 
co-determination, or even on a reduction of that worker participation by a 
two-thirds majority that must represent two-thirds of the employees in at 
least two Member States. This means that the British and Spanish 
representatives can outvote the German representatives. If the 
management and the SNB agree so or negotiations fail but the 
management still wants to establish a SE by merger than the standard 
rules apply. In case of a merger this means that not only proceedings 
regarding information and consultation are applicable but also the 
standard rules regarding board-level representation, because the 
threshold of 25% of employees concerned were covered by any form of 
co-determination so far resulting in a transfer of the equal proportion of 
employee representatives in the board as provided by German law. The 
registered office can be transferred to the Netherlands. 
 
Case 3. Company A, a German AG with 4,500 employees in Germany, has 
branches in the UK with 3,500 employees and in Spain with 2,000 
employees. Company A wants to convert into a SE and transfer its seat to 
the Netherlands. The SNB consists of 11 members (5 from Germany, 4 
from the UK and another 2 from Spain). In this instance, worker 
participation cannot be reduced. The only thing that changes regarding 
worker participation is that the board-level representatives are not any 
longer only from Germany but also from the UK and Spain. Thus, the 
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board-level representation becomes European. Another question under 
negotiations might be that the management wants to change its structure 
from two-tier to one-tier, a choice it did not have before, resulting in new 
arrangements regarding worker participation. It is not clear so far, how 
co-determination as provided by German law for the two-tier structure can 
be transferred to the one-tier structure. Additionally, in case of conversion 
it is not possible to transfer the registered office at the same time. 
Consequently, it must stay in Germany for the moment, but can be 
transferred later without liquidation and new foundation of the SE.  
 
Resume 
As indicated by these cases, it will take a great effort of the parties 
concerned, the SNB and the management, who are determined by varying 
preferences, aims, and traditions, to reach an agreement on the issue of 
worker involvement. Upon all doubts, it must be recognised that the 
creation of the SE and with it the provisions regarding employee 
involvement are fundamental. Probably, it is not that “miracle” that has 
been proclaimed by some authors (see for instance Hirte, 2002), but it is 
a step in the right direction. Of course, pressures on the national systems 
of corporate governance increase, and not all people concerned will 
benefit, but overall the competition position of companies in the EU and 
the EEA in comparison to companies outside this economic area is 
strengthened (Blanquet, 2002). In essence, the introduction of the SE 
might support the creation of a European corporate governance system 
that consists of European best practices.  
 
The SE and worker participation  Sandra Schwimbersky 
 
Page 14 
Bibliography 
Bärmann, Johannes (1970) Europäische Integration im Gesellschaftsrecht. FIW 
Schriftenreihe No. 54, Köln/Berlin/Bonn/München, Carl Heymanns. 
Bean, R. (1999) Comparative Industrial Relations: an introduction to cross-national 
perspectives. 2nd edition. London, Routledge. 
Blanquet, Francoise (2002) Das Statut der Europäischen Aktiengesellschaft (Societas 
Europaea „SE“) – Ein Gemeinschaftsinstrument für die grenzübergreifende 
Zusammenarbeit im Dienste der Unternehmen. Zeitschrift für Unternehmens- und 
Gesellschaftsrecht, 31(1), 21-65. 
Blyton, P. and Turnbull, P. (1994) The Dynamics of employee relations. Basingstoke, 
Macmillan. 
Charny, David (1991) Competitive among Jurisdictions in Formulating Corporate Law 
Rules: An American Perspective on the „Race to the Bottom” in the European 
Communities. Harvard International Law Journal, 32(2), 423-456. 
Council Directive 94/45/EC of 22 September 1994 on the establishment of a European 
Works Council or a procedure in Community-scale undertakings and Community-
scale groups of undertakings for the purpose of informing and consulting 
employees. Official Journal of the European Communities No. L254 of 30/09/1994, 
p 64 et seqq. 
Council Directive 2001/86/EC supplementing the Statute for a European company with 
regard to the involvement of employees. Official Journal of the European 
Communities No. L294 of 10/11/2001, 22-32. Available from: 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/internal_market/en/company/company/cases/01-
86en.pdf [Accessed 12/07/2003] 
Council Regulation (EC) No. 2157/2001 on the Statute for a European Company (SE).. 
Official Journal of the European Communities No. L294 of 10/11/2001, 1-21. 
Available from: http://europa.eu.int/comm/internal_market/en/ 
company/company/cases/01-2157en.pdf [Accessed 12/07/2003] 
Decision of the EEA joint committee No 93/2002 of 25 June 2002 amending Annex XXII 
(Company law) to the EEA Agreement. Official Journal of the European 
Communities No. L266 of 3rd of October 2002, 69-70. Available from: 
http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/pri/en/oj/dat/2002/l_266/l_26620021003en 
00690070.pdf [Accessed 18/09/2003] 
ETUC (2003) Arbeitnehmerbeteiligung in der Europäischen Aktiengesellschaft – Ein 
gewerkschaftlicher Leitfaden. Brussels, ETUC. 
European Commission (Commission) (1970) Proposal for a council regulation embodying 
a statute for the European company. Official Journal of the European Communities 
No. C124 of 10/10/1970, p 1 et seqq. 
European Commission (1989a) Proposal for a council regulation on the statute for a 
European company. Official Journal of the European Communities No. C263 of 
16/10/1989, p 41 et seqq. 
European Commission (1989b) Proposal for a Council Directive complementing the 
statute for a European company with regard to the involvement of employees in the 
European company. Official Journal of the European Communities No. C263 of 
16/10/1989, p 69 et seqq. 
European Commission (1991a) Amended proposal for a council regulation on the statute 
for a European company. Official Journal of the European Communities No. C176 of 
08/07/1991, p 1 et seqq. 
European Commission (1991b) Amended proposal for a council directive complementing 
the statute for a European company with regard to the involvement of employees in 
the European company. Official Journal of the European Communities No. C138 of 
29/05/1991, p 8 et seqq. 
European Commission (1997) Final Report of the Group of Experts on European Systems 
of Worker Involvement. C4-0455/1997. European Communities. Available from: 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/employment_social/soc-dial/labour/davignon/davi_ 
en.htm [Accessed 12/07/2003] 
The SE and worker participation  Sandra Schwimbersky 
 
Page 15 
European Economic and Social Committee (ESC) (1972) Opinion of the ESC. Official 
Journal of the European Communities No. C131 of 13/12/1972, p 32 et seqq. 
European Parliament (Parliament) (1974) Opinion of the Parliament. Official Journal of 
the European Communities No. C93 of 07/08/1974, p 22 et seqq.  
Grundmann, Stefan (2001) Wettbewerb der Regelgeber im Europäischen 
Gesellschaftsrecht – jedes Marktsegment hat seine Struktur. Zeitschrift für 
Unternehmens- und Gesellschaftsrecht, 30(6), 783-832. 
Heinze, Meinhard (2002) Die Europäische Aktiengesellschaft. Zeitschrift für 
Unternehmens- und Gesellschaftsrecht, 31(1), 66-95. 
Herfs-Röttgen, Ebba (2001) Arbeitnehmerbeteiligung in der Europäischen 
Aktiengesellschaft. Neue Zeitschrift für Arbeitsrecht, 18(8), 424-429. 
Hirte, Heribert (2002) Die Europäische Aktiengesellschaft. Neue Zeitschrift für 
Gesellschaftsrecht, 5(1), 1-10. 
Hommelhoff, Peter (2001) Einige Bemerkungen zur Organisationsverfassung der 
Europäischen Aktiengesellschaft. Die Aktiengesellschaft, 46(6), 279-288. 
The Iceland Stock Exchange (ICEX) (2004) Guidelines on Corporate Governance. 
Available from: http://www.ecgi.org/codes/country_pages/codes_iceland.htm 
[Accessed 12/07/2004] 
Katz, H. C./Kochan, T. A. (1992) An Introduction to Collective Bargaining and Industrial 
Relations. New York, McGraw Hill. 
Keller, Berndt (2002) Die Europäische Aktiengesellschaft und Arbeitnehmerbeteiligung. 
WSI-Mitteilungen, 55(4),203-212. 
Kloster, Lars (2003) Societas Europaea und europäische Unternehmenszusam-
menschlüsse. Europäische Zeitschrift für Wirtschaftsrecht, 14(10), 293-301. 
Kluge, Norbert/Stollt, Michael (2004a) Overview: Workers’ participation at board level in 
the EU-15. In: ETUI/Hans Böckler Foundation. The European Company – Prospects 
for board-level representation. Brussels/Düsseldorf, ETUI and Hans Böckler 
Foundation, p 67-68. 
Kluge, Norbert/Stollt, Michael (2004b) Overview: Workers’ participation at board level in 
the new EU member states. In: ETUI/Hans Böckler Foundation. The European 
Company – Prospects for board-level representation. Brussels/Düsseldorf, ETUI and 
Hans Böckler Foundation, p 70-74. 
Kochan, T. A. (1980) Collective Bargaining and Industrial Relations: from Theory to 
Policy and Practice. Homewood (Illinois), Richard Irwin. 
Köstler, Roland (2002) Die Europäische Aktiengesellschaft. In: Hans Böckler Stiftung 
(ed.) Die Europäische Aktiengesellschaft – Eine Einführung in das Vorhaben der 
Europäischen Aktiengesellschaft. Arbeitshilfe für Aufsichtsräte 6. Düsseldorf, Hans 
Böckler Stiftung, pp 7-36. 
Köstler, Roland (2003) Die Mitbestimmung der Europäischen Aktiengesellschaft. In: 
Rosen, Rüdiger von. Die Europa AG – Eine Perspektive für deutsche Unternehmen? 
Proceedings of the Conference at 31st of October 2002 held at the Deutsches 
Aktieninstitut. Frankfurt, Deutsches Aktieninstitut, pp 36-46. 
Liechtensteinische Landesbank Aktiengesellschaft (LLB) (2002) Geschäftsbericht – 
Corporate Governance. Available from: 
http://www.llb.li/llb2003.nsf/Files/Geschaeftsbericht/$File/LLBGB2002CorporateGov
ernance.pdf [Accessed 12/07/2004] 
Lutter, Marcus (2002) Europäische Aktiengesellschaft – Rechtsfigur mit Zukunft? 
Betriebs-Berater, 57(1), 1-7. 
Mävers, Gunther (2002) Die Mitbestimmung der Arbeitnehmer in der Europäischen 
Aktiengesellschaft. Baden-Baden, Nomos. 
Pluskat, Sorika (2001) Die Arbeitnehmerbeteiligung in der geplanten Europäischen AG. 
Deutsches Steuerrecht, 39(35), 1483-1490. 
Röthig, Oliver (2002) SE negotiations and outcomes. Uni-Europa. Available from: 
http://www.seeurope-network.org/homepages/seeurope/file_uploads/unieuropa 
creatingse-flowchart16-09-02.pdf [Accessed 10/07/2004] 
Sanders, Pieter (1966) Vorentwurf eines Statuts für eine europäische Aktiengesellschaft. 
Schiedam, European Commission. 
The SE and worker participation  Sandra Schwimbersky 
 
Page 16 
Schulten, Thorsten/Zagelmeyer, Stefan/Carley, Mark (1998) Board-level representation 
in Europe. Available from: http://www.eiro.eurofound.ie/print/1998/09/study/ 
tn9809201s.html [Accessed 11/07/2004] 
Schulz, Andreas/Geismar, Bernhard (2001) Die Europäische Aktiengesellschaft – Eine 
kritische Bestandsaufnahme. Deutsches Steuerrecht, 39(26), 1078-1086. 
Swiss Exchange (SWX) (2002) Corporate Governance-Richtlinie, RCLG. Available from: 
http://www2.eycom.ch/corporate-governance/reference/pdfs/3/de.pdf [Accessed 
12/07/2004] 
Teichmann, Christoph (2002) Die Einführung der Europäischen Aktiengesellschaft – 
Grundlagen der Ergänzung des europäischen Statuts durch den deutschen 
Gesetzgeber. Zeitschrift für Unternehmens- und Gesellschaftsrecht, 31(3), 383-
464. 
Theisen, Manuel R./Wenz, Martin (2002) Hintergründe, historische Entwicklung und 
Grundkonzeption. In: Theisen, Manuel/Wenz, Martin (eds) Die Europäische 
Aktiengesellschaft – Recht, Steuern und Betriebswirtschaft der Societas Europaea 
(SE). Stuttgart, Schäffer-Poeschel, pp 1-50. 
Weiss, Manfred (2003) Recent Developments in German and European Labour Law. In: 
Müller-Jentsch, Walther/Weitbrecht, Jörg (eds) The changing contours of German 
Industrial Relations. München/Mering, Rainer Hampp, pp 157-173. 
Wenz, Martin (2003) Einsatzmöglichkeiten einer Europäischen Aktiengesellschaft in der 
Unternehmenspraxis aus betriebswirtschaftlicher Sicht. Die Aktiengesellschaft, 
48(4), 185-196. 
Wymeersch, Eddie (2001) Company Law in Europe and European Company Law. In: 
Reports for the 1st European Jurists Forum in Nuremberg 2001. Baden-Baden, 
Nomos, pp 85-164 
 
